Agent Jurisprudence by Huhns, Michael N. & Singh, Munindar P.
University of South Carolina
Scholar Commons




University of South Carolina - Columbia, huhns@sc.edu
Munindar P. Singh
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/csce_facpub
Part of the Computer Engineering Commons
This Article is brought to you by the Computer Science and Engineering, Department of at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu.
Publication Info
Published in IEEE Internet Computing, Volume 2, Issue 2, 1998, pages 90-91.
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/servlet/opac?punumber=4236
© 1998 by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
90
MARCH • APRIL 1998 h t tp ://computer.org/ in te rne t/ IEEE INTERNET COMPUTING
The agent metaphor comes packaged
with a number of powerful abstrac-
tions. Some of these are psychological,
such as beliefs, knowledge, and inten-
tions—abstractions that were tradi-
tionally studied in AI. However, there
are a number of other abstractions
that the agent metaphor brings to the
fore. Of these, we have been empha-
sizing the social abstractions. Close
cousins of the social abstractions are
the ethical and legal abstractions.
These too are being recognized as
increasingly important in developing
agents that are not only sociable, but
also well behaved.
AN UPRIGHT AGENT
Traditional computing approaches to
actions focus on their causes and
effects. But with agents, we also need
to distinguish between right and
wrong, legal and illegal. We need to
make this distinction as agent devel-
opers, and we might also want the
agents to make the distinction. This is
so they can be trusted to act according
to a set of proscribed ethics and laws,
thereby properly representing humans
in contractual settings. With emerg-
ing applications in mind, we review
some of the essential concepts of agent
jurisprudence.
Let’s begin with the simpler aspects
of legal reasoning and leave the
greater problems of ethics to a later
column. 
AGENT CONTRACTS
A contract represents a legal relation
among parties. Contracts can also exist
among agents, as representatives of
human actors. For simplicity, we con-
sider contracts that involve no more
than two agents, although some recent
work treats more general settings.
Some of the most interesting legal
ideas for agents originate from the work
of the American jurist, Wesley New-
comb Hohfeld (1879–1918).1 After
analyzing the use of legal terms such as
“right,” Hohfeld concluded that the
legal meanings of the terms were not
clear and proposed a number of specif-
ic definitions. Agent researchers, as well
as philosophers, have recently begun to
study Hohfeld’s definitions.
An interesting characteristic of the
now carefully defined legal terms is
that they can be used to describe
(legal) relations among agents. As a
consequence, they provide inherently
multiagent abstractions.
TERMS TO CONTRACT BY
Each of Hohfeld’s terms has an associ-
ated correlate term, which applies
when the same relation is viewed from
the perspective of the other agent.
Some correlate terms are claim and
duty, privilege and exposure, power and
liability, and immunity and disability.
■ A claim—what one agent can
demand from another—is the
most common kind of right. For
example, an agent Alice who has
rendered services to an agent Bob
has a claim to be paid by Bob. Bob,
in turn, has a duty to pay Alice. 
■ A privilege exists when one agent
is free from the claims of another.
In other words, it is the absence of
a duty to refrain from a given act.
For example, Alice has a privilege
to read Bob’s files if Alice has no
duty not to do so. In this case, Bob
has an exposure to Alice’s reading
his files.
■ A power is the ability of an agent
to force (if it so desires) the alter-
ation of a legal relation between
itself and another agent. For exam-
ple, Alice’s privilege to read Bob’s
files may have arisen because of an
explicit assignment by Bob. That
is, if Bob owns the files, he has the
power to grant anyone a privilege
to read them, but may or may not
have the additional power to take
away that privilege once granted. 
The correlate of power is liabili-
ty. Let’s assume Bob has the power
to take away the privilege to read
his files. Then Alice is liable to Bob
for losing that privilege. Notice
that Alice is also liable for gaining
a privilege, which only goes to
show that the technical meaning of
liability need not have the conno-
tations of the informal meaning.
■ An immunity is a freedom from
the power of another agent. For
example, if Bob owns some files,
then Alice lacks the power to take
away his privilege of reading them.
Thus, by fact of ownership, Bob is
immune to Alice’s taking away his
privilege. Correlatively, Alice has a
disability to take away the privi-
lege from Bob.
Hohfeld argued that the above selec-
tion of terms covers the legal concepts
related to contracts and the rights and
duties of individuals. We can use these
concepts to establish the norms of
agent societies, where the agents are
aware of the different shades of each
other’s rights.
CONCEPTS IN ACTION
Hohfeld’s concepts can be used wher-
ever the relationship among agents
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represents a contract. One major arena for applying these
concepts is in defining and testing for the compliance require-
ments of the interactions among different agents. For exam-
ple, we can say that an agent who offers to buy a product
must pay the amount it originally offered unless the seller
releases the offering agent from this duty.
If you’re interested in reading more about research in this
area, see Castelfranchi2 and Krogh and Herrestad.3,4 The arti-
cles further elaborate the above and related concepts in mul-
tiagent systems. In other work, Singh5 has begun relating for-
malizations of the legal concepts to the more standard social
concepts.
SYSTEMS OF THE BIMONTH
Although we are not aware of any implemented system based
on Hohfeld’s concepts that is available over the Web, there
are some interesting expert systems and knowledge bases that
readers may try out. These are specialized to different
domains.
Branting and Aha have developed a case-based reasoning
system for legal reasoning, a demo of which can be viewed at
http://meru.cs.uwyo.edu/~cable/.
Wysh (http://www.austlii.edu.au/ austlii/wysh/), an exper-
imental Web-based shell available from the Australasian Legal
Information Institute, helps a user create a legal knowledge
base. Although not directly relevant to our discussion, it gives
instances (see, for example, http://www.austlii.edu.
au/austlii/wysh/carers.html) of the kinds of legal rules agents
would have to deal with.
If you discover any Web agents that perform legal reason-
ing, please let us know and we will check them out! ■
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